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Note
GUNDY V. UNITED STATES: BREATHING NEW (AND
UNEXPECTED) LIFE INTO THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
BRANDON K. WHARTON *
In Gundy v. United States, 1 the Supreme Court of the United States
considered whether title 34, section 20913(d) of the United States Code, 2
which allows the Attorney General of the United States to “specify the
applicability” of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s
(“SORNA”) registration requirements to pre-Act offenders, violates the
nondelegation doctrine. 3 The nondelegation doctrine is a principle of
constitutional and administrative law that “bars Congress from transferring
its legislative power to another branch of Government.” 4 The Court held that
section 20913(d) does not violate the nondelegation doctrine because it
“makes clear that the Attorney General’s discretion extends only to
considering and addressing feasibility issues.” 5 Because the Court’s
statutory interpretation of section 20913(d) is consistent with Reynolds v.
United States, 6 which also interpreted the statutory meaning of SORNA, and
because section 20913(d) provides an intelligible principle to guide the
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1. 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
2. See 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2018) (“The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify
the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the
enactment of this chapter or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for
the registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable
to comply with subsection (b).”).
3. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (“This case requires us to decide whether 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d),
enacted as part of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), violates [the
nondelegation] doctrine.”).
4. Id. at 2121–23.
5. Id. at 2123–24.
6. 565 U.S. 432 (2012); see infra Section IV.A.
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Attorney General’s discretion, 7 the outcome in Gundy was correct. The
Court, however, underemphasized the many practical consequences that
would have followed if the dissent’s view had prevailed. 8
I. THE CASE
In October 2005, Herman Gundy “pleaded guilty under Maryland law
for sexually assaulting a minor.” 9 At the time, Gundy was on supervised
release for an unrelated federal offense. 10 A conviction for sexual assault
under Maryland law was a violation of the terms of Gundy’s federal
supervised release. 11 As a result, in March 2006, Gundy also pleaded guilty
in federal court to violating the conditions of his release. 12 After completing
both his state and federal prison sentences, Gundy took up residence in the
state of New York. 13 Under the registration requirements of SORNA—as
specified in regulations promulgated by the Attorney General—Gundy was
required to register as a sex offender. 14 This he did not do. 15
Accordingly, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York found Gundy guilty of failing to register as a sex offender. 16
He then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s decision and rejected Gundy’s
assertion that SORNA violated nondelegation principles. 17 Notably, the
Second Circuit’s opinion did not include any substantive discussion on the
merits of Gundy’s nondelegation claim. 18
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to determine
whether section 20913(d), enacted as part of SORNA, violates the

7. See infra Section IV.B.
8. See infra Section IV.C.
9. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122; see also United States v. Gundy, 804 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir.
2015) (“Herman Gundy was convicted of violating Maryland Criminal Law § 3-306, Sexual Offense
in the Second Degree.”), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
10. United States v. Gundy, 695 F. App’x 639, 640 (2d Cir. 2017) (“While serving a federal
sentence for violating Maryland Criminal Law § 3-306, Sexual Offense in the Second Degree,
during his supervised release for a prior federal offense, Gundy was transferred from Maryland to a
federal prison in Pennsylvania.”), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
11. Gundy, 804 F.3d at 143.
12. Id.
13. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122.
14. Id. SORNA was enacted in 2006. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 12 Stat. 587, 587–88 (adopting SORNA in Title I).
15. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122.
16. Id. at 143.
17. United States v. Gundy, 695 F. App’x 639, 641 n.2 (2d Cir. 2017) (rejecting Gundy’s
argument, which was made only for preservation purposes, that SORNA violates the nondelegation
doctrine), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
18. Id.
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nondelegation doctrine by allowing the Attorney General to “specify the
applicability” of SORNA’s registration requirements for pre-Act offenders. 19
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Gundy v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States
declined to invoke the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate an act of Congress
that empowers the Attorney General to “‘specify the applicability’ of
SORNA’s . . . requirements” for pre-Act offenders. 20 Section II.A examines
the statutory language of SORNA and the Court’s interpretation of the Act’s
text and purpose in the relevant predecessor case of Reynolds v. United
States. 21 Section II.B. recounts the origins and early applications of the
nondelegation doctrine. 22 Lastly, Section II.C discusses the Supreme Court’s
articulation of the “intelligible principle standard” and retreat from using the
nondelegation doctrine to strike down federal laws. 23
A. Enacting and Interpreting SORNA in Reynolds
Before tracing the history and applications of the nondelegation
doctrine, it is helpful to understand the goals and statutory framework of
SORNA. 24 The Act addresses a matter that had been on Congress’s mind for
decades—requiring individuals “convicted of certain sex crimes to provide
state governments with (and to regularly update) information, such as names
and current addresses, for inclusion on state and federal sex offender
registries.” 25 Before SORNA’s enactment, sex offender registration
“consisted of a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration
systems.” 26 In response, the Act was designed to promote uniformity and
efficacy by repealing existing federal sex offender registration laws and
replacing them with a single comprehensive registration scheme (i.e.
SORNA). 27
Among its provisions, SORNA mandates that sex offenders provide and
update information that will be used on federal and state sex offender

19. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122–23 (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d)).
20. Id. (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d)) (“The District Court and Court of Appeals . . . rejected
[Gundy’s nondelegation] claim, as had every other court (including eleven Courts of Appeals) to
consider the issue. . . . Today, we join the consensus and affirm.” (citation omitted)).
21. See infra Section II.A.
22. See infra Section II.B.
23. See infra Section II.C.
24. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901–91 (2018).
25. Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 434 (2012).
26. Id. at 435.
27. Id.
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registries (“registration requirements”). 28 Offenders who do not comply with
SORNA’s registration requirements are subject to a prison term of at least
one year. 29 The Act applies prospectively for those offenders who were still
in prison (or had not yet been convicted) at the time of SORNA’s enactment
(“post-Act offenders”). 30 It also applies retroactively to those offenders who
were released from prison before SORNA took effect (“pre-Act
offenders”). 31
Post-Act offenders are required to register before they are released from
prison in accordance with section 20913(b). 32 Of course, some offenders
literally cannot satisfy this provision because they were released from prison
prior to SORNA ever becoming law. 33 In other words, even if that group of
offenders (i.e. the pre-Act offenders) registered and kept their registration
current, they would not be doing so until after their release from prison. 34
This would violate section 20913(b). 35 To resolve this dilemma, section
20913(d)—the particular provision of SORNA at issue in Gundy—says that
pre-Act offenders who cannot comply with the section 20913(b) requirement
are subject to rules of registration as specified by the Attorney General. 36
Still, a pertinent question remains: If you are a pre-Act offender, do you
have to register even if the Attorney General has not promulgated rules of
registration yet? 37 That is, does the text of SORNA automatically mandate
that pre-Act offenders register unless they have been given a waiver of some
sort, or does it instead suggest that pre-Act offenders do not have to register
until the Attorney General affirmatively says that they must? 38 That was the
question presented to the Court in Reynolds v. United States. 39 And in
28. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(a) (“A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in
each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the
offender is a student.”).
29. Id. § 20913(e) (“Each jurisdiction, other than a Federally recognized Indian tribe, shall
provide a criminal penalty that includes a maximum term of imprisonment that is greater than 1 year
for the failure of a sex offender to comply with the requirements of this subchapter.”).
30. Id. § 20913(b).
31. Id. § 20913(d).
32. Id. § 20913(b).
33. See Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 441 (2012) (“The Second Statement, for
example, says that a sex offender must register before completing his prison term, but the provision
says nothing about when a pre-Act offender who completed his prison term pre-Act must register.”).
34. See id. (explaining that “Pre-Act offenders, aware of such complexities, lacunae, and
difficulties, might . . . reach different conclusions about whether, or how, the new registration
requirements applied to them”).
35. Id.
36. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d).
37. Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 434 (explaining that the Court had to determine when the registration
requirements take effect with respect to pre-Act offenders).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Reynolds, the Court held that SORNA’s registration requirements only apply
to pre-Act offenders once “the Attorney General specifies that they do
apply.” 40
As part of its statutory analysis, the Court in Reynolds made two
observations about the Act that are relevant to the corresponding statutory
analysis in Gundy. First, it noted that Congress intended for pre-Act
offenders to be covered by SORNA’s registration requirements. 41 Second,
the Court explained that Congress had “no reason to believe” that the
Attorney General would not promulgate rules mandating the registration of
pre-Act offenders. 42 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia also agreed that
the Act was intended to apply to pre-Act offenders. 43 According to his
dissent, it was “simply implausible that the Attorney General was given
discretion to determine whether coverage of pre-Act offenders (one of the
purposes of the Act) should exist.” 44 But, unlike the majority, Justice Scalia
thought that section 20913(d) meant that SORNA automatically applies to
pre-Act offenders subject only to any exceptions made by the Attorney
General. 45
B. Origins and Applications of the Nondelegation Doctrine
Though the Reynolds Court considered when the provisions of SORNA
would apply to pre-Act offenders, it did not consider whether delegating this
power to the Attorney General was constitutionally permissible in the first
place. That is to say, the Reynolds Court did not contemplate whether
section 20913(d) was a violation of the nondelegation doctrine. And while
this question was ultimately answered by the plurality in Gundy, it is first
necessary to understand what the nondelegation doctrine is and how it has
been applied by the Court.
The power to legislate is vested in the Congress through Article I of the
United States Constitution. 46 And, though the Court has recognized that
Congress retains the ability to “obtain[] the assistance of its coordinate
Branches,” 47 the Court has also held that Congress is precluded from
delegating “strictly and exclusively legislative” powers from itself to other

40. Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 442.
42. Id. at 444–45.
43. Id. at 450 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 450–51.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States . . . .”).
47. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
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branches of government. 48 As a result, if the power delegated by Congress
is exceedingly broad and purely legislative in character, then the delegation
will not pass constitutional muster. 49 This concept is known as the
nondelegation doctrine. 50
The Court was receptive to nondelegation challenges to federal laws on
two occasions in 1935. 51 In each case, the Court looked to the breadth of the
statute at issue to discern whether the challenged provisions transferred too
much policymaking power from Congress to the executive branch. In both
cases, the Court concluded that Congress had, in fact, impermissibly
delegated power to a coordinate branch of government. 52 And thus, at least
for a very brief time, 53 the nondelegation doctrine became one route for the
judiciary to invalidate acts of Congress. 54
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 55 the Court invoked the nondelegation
doctrine to nullify a statutory provision that delegated power from Congress
to the President but did not instruct the President on when or how to use that
power. 56 At issue in that case was a particular aspect of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”) that authorized the President to prohibit
the transportation of “hot oil” (i.e. petroleum and petroleum products that
exceeded certain statutory quotas) in interstate or foreign commerce. 57
Importantly, NIRA’s hot oil provision did not outline “circumstances or
conditions in which transportation of petroleum or petroleum products should
be prohibited.” 58 In other words, discretion was left to the President alone to

48. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825); see also Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (“The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or
transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.”).
49. Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 421.
50. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–72 (explaining that “Congress generally cannot
delegate its legislative power to another Branch”). A helpful corollary is to consider nondelegation
inquiries as a particular application of a separation of powers analysis. When a legislative enactment
is found to have violated nondelegation principles, the Court is saying the provision has not
accorded due respect for the separation of powers—a feature that is, of course, required by the
Constitution. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 319
(2000) (explaining that “the principle of nondelegation might seem . . . an inevitable implication of
the division of powers”).
51. See infra notes 55 and 63 and accompanying text.
52. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373.
53. See infra Section II.C.
54. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373.
55. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
56. Id. at 417–18.
57. Id. at 414–15, 418; see also id. at 436 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (“Oil produced or
transported in excess of a statutory quota is known in the industry as ‘hot oil,’ and the record is
replete with evidence as to the effect of such production and transportation upon the economic
situation and upon national recovery.”).
58. Id. at 417 (majority opinion).
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determine when—if at all—the prohibition should be imposed. 59 Because
NIRA’s hot oil provision did not declare policy, establish a standard, or lay
down a rule for when the President was authorized to invoke the prohibition,
the Court held that it violated the nondelegation doctrine. 60 At the same time,
though, the Court noted that delegations of legislative power are permissible
when Congress provides an intelligible principle that instructs the delegee on
how and when the power may properly be exercised. 61
Just a few months later, in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 62 the Court employed the same rationale—that excessive delegations
of policymaking power are unconstitutional—to nullify another provision of
NIRA. 63 Under NIRA’s “Live Poultry Code,” the President was given
authority to either (1) approve regulations of the poultry industry that
promote “fair competition” if those regulations were proposed by trade or
industrial associations, or (2) promulgate such regulations on his own
motion. 64 Violations of the Code were punishable as misdemeanors and
carried a fine of up to $500 per offense. 65 After recounting its analysis in
Panama Refining Co., the Court again emphasized that “Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion
to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed.” 66 But, the Court said, this
was exactly what the Live Poultry Code allowed. 67 Among its faults, the
Live Poultry Code never defined what constituted “fair competition.” 68
Rather, the Act seemed to leave it to the executive branch to determine for
itself what “fair competition” meant. 69 And, in so doing, the executive
branch alone could determine what conduct was and was not criminal under

59. Id.
60. Id. at 430.
61. Id. at 429–30 (“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform,
such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” (quoting J.W. Hampton,
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))).
62. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
63. Id. at 551.
64. Id. at 521–23 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 703) (1933)).
65. Id. at 523.
66. Id. at 537–38.
67. Id. (noting that under the Live Poultry Code, the President has broad power to impose codes
that operate as penal statutes).
68. Id. at 531 (“The Act does not define ‘fair competition.’”).
69. Id. (“What is meant by ‘fair competition’ as the term is used in the act? Does it refer to a
category established in the law, and is the authority to make codes limited accordingly? Or is it
used as a convenient designation for whatever set of laws the formulators of a code for a particular
trade or industry may propose and the President may approve (subject to certain restrictions), or the
President may himself prescribe, as being wise and beneficent provisions for the government of the
trade or industry in order to accomplish the broad purposes of rehabilitation, correction, and
expansion which are stated in the first section of title 1?”).
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the Live Poultry Code. 70 As a result, the Live Poultry Code provision of
NIRA was also rendered an unconstitutional violation of nondelegation
principles. 71
Both Panama Refining Co. 72 and A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. relied
on a legal principle, now known as the intelligible principle standard, derived
from the 1925 case of J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States. 73 In J.W.
Hampton, the Court stated as follows:
If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates
is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden
delegation of legislative power. If it is thought wise to vary the
customs duties according to changing conditions of production at
home and abroad, it may authorize the Chief Executive to carry out
this purpose, with the advisory assistance of a Tariff Commission
appointed under Congressional authority. 74
Put differently, the J.W. Hampton Court indeed recognized that there are
limits to the delegation of certain legislative authority, but in so doing, it also
implicitly recognized that there are at least some permissible acts of
delegation. 75
C. The Court’s Retreat from Nondelegation and Articulation of an
Intelligible Principle Standard
Two of the cases cited above—Panama Refining Co. and A.L.A.
Schecter Poultry Corp.—are the only instances in which the Court has used
the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate federal laws. 76 The Court has
rejected every nondelegation challenge to a federal law ever since.77 Strictly
speaking, both of those decisions remain good law to this day. But the Court
more clearly articulated the modern approach to nondelegation challenges in
Mistretta v. United States. 78

70. Id. at 537–38.
71. Id. at 542.
72. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429–30 (1935) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
73. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
74. Id. at 409.
75. See Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 430 (explaining that “the Court has recognized that
there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend”).
76. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As the Court
points out, we have invoked the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation to invalidate a law only
twice in our history, over half a century ago.”).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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Pervasive in the federal criminal justice system before the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 was a practice called “indeterminate sentencing.” 79
Although federal statutes specified minimum and maximum penalties for
federal crimes, they also gave sweeping discretion to sentencing judges to
determine the severity of an offender’s punishment. 80 This discretion was
shared, in part, with the federal parole commission. 81 The results were
problematic. 82 It was not uncommon for similarly situated defendants to
receive vastly different sentences depending on who the sentencing judge
happened to be. 83 In response, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, which made drastic changes to the federal sentencing regime as it
existed at the time. 84
Most relevant for the present discussion, the Act revoked discretion
from sentencing judges and created an independent commission (i.e. the
Sentencing Commission) that was authorized to impose mandatory
sentencing ranges on the United States district courts. 85 In effect, the Act
tasked the Sentencing Commission with devising “sentencing guidelines for
every federal criminal offense.” 86 It also made the sentence, once imposed,
basically determinate. 87 The Act abolished the federal parole system, limited
the opportunity for an offender to appeal their sentence, and limited
opportunities for early release. 88 As for the composition of the Sentencing
Commission itself, the statute envisioned a bipartisan group of federal judges
and other selected members who would serve a fixed term and could only be
removed from their positions for cause. 89
A few years after the Act took effect, John Mistretta brought a challenge
to the new sentencing regime, asserting that it was a violation of the
nondelegation doctrine. 90 According to Mistretta, Congress provided the
Sentencing Commission with excessive legislative power by allowing the
Commission to determine mandatory sentencing ranges. 91 But Mistretta had
a problem. Unlike the essentially standardless delegations of power in
79. Id. at 363–67 (majority opinion).
80. Id. at 363, 365–66.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 365 (“Serious disparities in sentences . . . were common.”).
83. Id. (recounting prior attempts by Congress to reduce the sentencing disparities between
individual judges).
84. Id. at 367–69.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 371.
87. Id. at 367.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 368–69.
90. Id. at 370. At the point his case reached the Supreme Court, John Mistretta had already
pleaded guilty to conspiracy and agreement to distribute cocaine. Id. at 370–71.
91. Id. at 371.
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Panama Refining Co. and A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 92 Congress
included a whole host of guiding factors, purposes, and principles that the
Commission was required to consider as it fashioned its sentencing
guidelines. 93 For example, the Commission was required to “use current
average sentences ‘as a starting point’ for its structuring of the sentencing
ranges,” 94 evaluate “the nature and degree of the harm caused by the crime,” 95
and ensure that violent and repeat offenders received substantial time in
prison. 96 To be sure, the Act still left the Commission with a large amount
of discretion. 97 In fact, the Commission was even left to decide “which types
of crimes and which types of criminals are to be considered similar for the
purposes of sentencing.” 98 Even still, the Court did not agree with Mistretta’s
assessment that the Act’s delegated powers were too broad and too legislative
in character to withstand a constitutional challenge. 99
Writing for a near-unanimous court, 100 Justice Harry Blackmun
explained “that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.” 101 In
upholding the Act, the Court’s majority once again emphasized that
nondelegation challenges must be resolved under J.W. Hampton’s
“‘intelligible principle’ test.” 102 That is to say, as long as Congress has
provided the delegee with an intelligible principle to guide its exercise of the
delegated power, the delegation is constitutionally permissible.103
Following the Mistretta decision, the Court has upheld, among others, a
law allowing the Secretary of Transportation to impose user fees on pipeline
operators that were used to fund federal pipeline safety programs 104 and a law
permitting “the Attorney General to add or remove substances [to a schedule
of drugs under the Controlled Substances Act], or to move a substance from

92. See supra Section II.B.
93. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374–77 (describing the many guidelines and directives that Congress
included in the Sentencing Reform Act).
94. Id. at 375 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (1994)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 376–77.
97. Id. at 377.
98. Id. at 377–78.
99. Id. at 371.
100. Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter.
101. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
102. Id.(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); see
supra note 61 and accompanying text.
103. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372–73.
104. Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 214–15 (1989).
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one schedule to another.” 105 The Court (post-Schecter) has yet to identify a
single legislative delegation that fails the intelligible principle test.106
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Gundy v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States
addressed whether section 20913(d) of SORNA, which allows the Attorney
General to promulgate regulations that specify the registration requirements
for pre-Act offenders, was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
from Congress to the Attorney General. 107 In a plurality opinion authored by
Justice Kagan, the Court upheld section 20913(d) on the basis that it does not
violate nondelegation principles because the provision affirmatively requires
the Attorney General to “apply SORNA’s registration requirements as soon
as feasible to offenders convicted before the statute’s enactment.” 108 Thus,
under the plurality view, section 20913(d) only allows the Attorney General
to delay enforcement of SORNA against pre-Act offenders for feasibility
reasons. 109
The Court began by acknowledging that Congress is prohibited from
delegating or transferring strictly legislative power, but it noted that Congress
is not precluded from every act of delegation. 110 Congress is permitted to
delegate power so long as it provides an “intelligible principle” to guide the
delegee (here, the Attorney General) in their exercise of discretion.111 As a
result, nondelegation inquiries (including the one at issue in Gundy) are
largely questions of statutory interpretation. 112 The determination of whether
Congress enacted a statute containing an intelligible principle will, in turn,
answer the constitutional question—whether the nondelegation doctrine has
been violated. 113
For that reason, Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion begins by answering
the following question: Does SORNA—as Gundy and the dissenters
contend—provide the Attorney General with “‘unguided’ and ‘unchecked’

105. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 162 (1991).
106. See supra note 76.
107. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2122–23 (2019) (plurality opinion).
108. Id. at 2121 (emphasis added). This is to say that the Attorney General may not exercise
his discretion to determine whether SORNA should apply to pre-Act offenders in the first place.
This must be done as soon as practicable or feasible. This Note will refer to this concept as the
“feasibility standard.”
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2123.
111. Id. (“The constitutional question is whether Congress has supplied an intelligible principle
to guide the delegee’s use of discretion.”).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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authority”? 114 According to the plurality, the answer to that question is no. 115
The statute’s purpose and history reveal the opposite intent by Congress. 116
As Justice Kagan explained, the Court already interpreted the statutory
meaning of SORNA when it decided Reynolds v. United States. 117
In Reynolds, the Court determined that SORNA was intended to cover
both post-Act and pre-Act offenders. 118 Congress realized, however, that
implementing a comprehensive registration program would present a major
logistical concern: A large number of pre-Act offenders would have to be reregistered or newly registered. 119 Some of the offenders, for example, may
have already registered under existing state registry schemes. 120 Moreover,
many offenders would not be able to comply with the section 20913(b)
requirement to register before completing their prison sentence because their
prison sentence ended well before SORNA took effect. 121 Anticipating these
administrative and transitional concerns, Congress crafted a solution in
section 20913(d): The Attorney General would be responsible for examining
the issues and enforcing the registration requirements of SORNA against the
pre-Act offenders as soon as the transitional difficulties were resolved. 122
In explaining the plurality’s interpretation of section 20913(d), Justice
Kagan noted that statutory interpretation is a “holistic endeavor” that looks
not just to the challenged text by itself (as Gundy sought to do), but to the
challenged text in the full context in which it appears, alongside its purpose
and history. 123 And because everything from SORNA’s declaration of
purpose to its legislative history and definition of the term “sex offender”
suggests a congressional intent for SORNA to cover pre-Act offenders,
Gundy’s argument fell short. 124 According to the plurality, a holistic
statutory analysis of SORNA reveals that section 20913(d) “order[s] [pre-Act
offenders’] registration as soon as feasible.” 125
Because the authority conferred by Congress to the Attorney General
was limited only to allowing the Attorney General enough time to resolve
114. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 37, 45, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086)).
115. Id. at 2128 (“The phrase [‘specify the applicability’] instead means ‘specify how to apply
SORNA’ to pre-Act offenders if transitional difficulties require some delay.”).
116. Id. at 2125 (“Congress had made clear in SORNA’s text that the new registration
requirements would apply to pre-Act offenders.”).
117. Id. at 2124.
118. Id. at 2122.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2124–25; see also supra text accompanying notes 33–36.
122. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2125.
123. Id. at 2126 (quoting United Sav. Ass’n. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
124. Id. at 2127.
125. Id. at 2128.
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practical issues before enforcing SORNA against pre-Act offenders, the
plurality concluded that Congress provided an intelligible principle. 126 And
because the Court routinely upholds acts of Congress that give executive
officials discretion to implement governmental programs, the Court
concluded that section 20913(d) did not present a nondelegation concern and
was constitutionally permissible. 127
In a brief solo concurrence, Justice Alito agreed with the plurality that
SORNA did not offend the nondelegation doctrine given how the Court has
interpreted the doctrine since 1935. 128 At the same time, however, he
signaled that he would support an effort to reconsider the Court’s approach
to the nondelegation doctrine if reconsideration could garner majority
support on the Court at a later time with the full Court’s participation. 129
The dissent, written by Justice Gorsuch, considered the plurality’s view
of the nondelegation doctrine to be fundamentally at odds with the Framers’
notion of separation of powers. 130 And not only did the dissent’s
constitutional analysis favor Gundy, so too did its statutory analysis. 131
In interpreting section 20913(d) of SORNA, Justice Gorsuch rejected
the plurality’s reading—that the Act requires the Attorney General to impose
its registration requirements on pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible.132
Much to the contrary, the dissent believed that SORNA gave the Attorney
General “carte blanche” 133 about whether to take action. 134 In the dissent’s
view, the plurality simply “reimagine[d] the terms of the statute” by reading-

126. Id. at 2129.
127. Id. at 2130.
128. Id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that the Court has uniformly rejected
nondelegation challenges since 1935 and has upheld all delegations in which the statute includes a
“discernable standard”).
129. Id. at 2131 (“If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have
taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort. But because a majority is not willing to do
that, it would be freakish to single out the provision at issue here for special treatment.”). Justice
Kavanaugh was recused in Gundy. Later, in a statement respecting a denial of certiorari in an
unrelated case, Justice Kavanaugh indicated that he would be open to the dissent’s new approach to
nondelegation cases. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari) (“I write separately because Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the
Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in
future cases.”).
130. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2132 (“As the Department of Justice itself has acknowledged, SORNA ‘does not
require the Attorney General’ to impose registration requirements on pre-Act offenders ‘within a
certain time frame or by a date certain; it does not require him to act at all.’” (quoting Brief for
United States at 23, Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012) (No. 10-6549))).
133. Id. at 2144.
134. Id. at 2132 (“Congress thus gave the Attorney General free rein to write the rules for
virtually the entire existing sex offender population in this country . . . .”).
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in a feasibility standard. 135 More, Justice Gorsuch suggested that his
colleagues in the plurality misunderstood the Act’s legislative history. 136
According to the dissenting opinion, Congress did not include the “specify
the applicability” provision in section 20913(d) because of feasibility
concerns; it did so because members of Congress could not agree on what to
do with the pre-Act offenders. 137 In short, the dissent said that Congress—
apparently caught between a rock and a hard place—passed the buck to the
Attorney General, including on the central question of whether anything
should be done at all. 138 The most plausible statutory analysis, as the dissent
viewed it, is that SORNA allows the Attorney General to make “unbounded
policy choices.” 139 But even if the plurality’s statutory analysis—that section
20913(d) includes a feasibility standard—was correct, the dissent asserts that
SORNA would still be vulnerable to a nondelegation challenge. 140 Why?
According to the dissent, even a feasibility standard is too broad of a
delegation. 141 Because feasibility can mean different things to different
people, the dissent argued that the term is too amorphous for there to be
meaningful judicial review of whether the Attorney General’s actions were
because of feasibility concerns or for some other reason entirely. 142
And that takes us to the constitutional question. Unlike Justice
Kagan, 143 Justice Gorsuch’s dissent did not apply the intelligible principle
test to determine whether the SORNA delegation is constitutional. 144 The
dissent declined to do so because under its view the intelligible principle test
is entirely untethered from the Framers’ constitutional design and does not

135. Id. at 2131.
136. See id. (“Congress concluded that something had to be done about these ‘pre-Act’
offenders too. But it seems Congress couldn’t agree what that should be.”).
137. Id. at 2131–32.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2133.
140. Id. at 2145 (“But even this new dream of a statute wouldn’t be free from doubt. A statute
directing an agency to regulate private conduct to the extent ‘feasible’ can have many possible
meanings: It might refer to ‘technological’ feasibility, ‘economic’ feasibility, ‘administrative’
feasibility, or even ‘political’ feasibility. Such an ‘evasive standard’ could threaten the separation
of powers if it effectively allowed the agency to make the ‘important policy choices’ that belong to
Congress while frustrating ‘meaningful judicial review.’ And that seems exactly the case here . . . .”
(quoting Indus. Union Dep’t., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 676, 685–86 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment))).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2129 (plurality opinion) (“As noted earlier, this Court has held that a delegation is
constitutional so long as Congress has set out an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the delegee’s
exercise of authority.” (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928))).
144. Id. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (characterizing the intelligible principle test as a
“misadventure” by the Court).
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even find support in the case in which the phrase was first uttered. 145
According to the dissenters, the correct way to determine the permissibility
of a congressional delegation is not by resorting to the familiar intelligible
principle test but rather by conducting a tripartite “traditional separation-ofpowers test[].” 146
Under such an approach, Congress is permitted to delegate authority—
without offending the separation of powers—in only three circumstances. 147
First, Congress may allow another branch of government to “fill up the
details” when Congress itself has made the underlying policy decision. 148 In
these instances, delegation is acceptable because Congress has provided
enough information for the courts and the public to determine whether or not
the delegee has followed (or exceeded) Congress’s guidance. 149 Second,
Congress is permitted to enact laws that are contingent on fact finding by the
executive branch. 150 So, for example, Congress can pass a law that schedules
the construction of a bridge, and it can condition the bridge’s construction on
a cabinet secretary first making a “finding” that such a bridge would not
interfere with navigation capabilities. 151 In essence, the “fact-finding”
standard says that Congress can make the operation of a new law contingent
upon a specified triggering condition. 152 This, under the dissent’s analysis,
would not raise a separation of powers concern. 153 Third, Congress may
assign non-legislative responsibilities to the other branches (for example,
Congress can assign certain foreign affairs powers to the executive branch
because those powers are inherently within the scope of executive power). 154
In other words, there is no separation of powers concern when Congress
“delegates” power to the executive branch that is already properly within the
scope of executive power. 155
This tripartite test, according to the dissent, is what Chief Justice Taft
really was getting at when he first used the term “intelligible principle” in
145. Id. at 2139 (“This mutated version of the ‘intelligible principle’ remark has no basis in the
original meaning of the Constitution, in history, or even in the decision from which it was
plucked.”).
146. Id. (“For two decades, no one thought to invoke the ‘intelligible principle’ comment as a
basis to uphold a statute that would have failed more traditional separation-of-powers tests.”). This
Note will refer to this test interchangeably as the “tripartite test,” “modified test,” or “dissent’s
test.”
147. Id. at 2136–37.
148. Id. at 2136 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2136–37 (citing Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U.S. 385, 393 (1883)).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2137.
155. Id.
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J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States. 156 The dissent argued that SORNA
does not satisfy any of the prongs of the above-mentioned test. 157 First, it
does not “fill up the details” 158 because the applicability of SORNA’s
registration requirements to pre-Act offenders is not a “detail” in any sense
of the word. 159 Rather, it is a major policy concern that would implicate some
500,000 offenders. 160 Second, there was no “fact-finding” involved in
section 20913(d) because the text of the provision did not set any criteria for
when or how to enforce the statute against pre-Act offenders. 161 And third,
SORNA has nothing to do with foreign affairs or other inherent powers of
the executive branch. 162 Because, according to the dissent, the delegation in
section 20913(d) failed the tripartite test, it constituted an impermissible
delegation of legislative power. 163
IV. ANALYSIS
In Gundy v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that section 20913(d) of SORNA did not violate nondelegation principles
because the provision required the Attorney General to apply SORNA’s
registration requirements to pre-Act offenders “as soon as feasible.” 164
Gundy was correctly decided because the Court’s statutory interpretation of
SORNA in Reynolds v. United States already revealed that the Attorney
General is accorded only limited discretion under the Act. 165 Moreover, the
Gundy plurality opinion remains faithful to the approach the Court has taken
with nondelegation cases since 1935. 166 The plurality opinion would have
been made more persuasive, however, by emphasizing the practical
consequences of reviving the nondelegation doctrine given the regularity

156. Id. at 2139 (“And when Chief Justice Taft wrote of an ‘intelligible principle,’ it seems plain
enough that he sought only to explain the operation of these traditional tests; he gave no hint of a
wish to overrule or revise them.”).
157. Id. at 2143–44.
158. Id. at 2136 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)).
159. Id. at 2143 (“But it’s hard to see how the statute before us could be described as leaving
the Attorney General with only details to dispatch.”).
160. Id.
161. Id. (“Far from deciding the factual predicates to a rule set forth by statute, the Attorney
General himself acknowledges that the law entitles him to make his own policy decisions.”).
162. Id. at 2143–44.
163. See id. at 2145 (“Most everyone, the plurality included, concedes that if SORNA allows
the Attorney General as much authority as we have outlined, it would present ‘a nondelegation
question.’”).
164. See supra Section III.
165. See infra Section IV.A.
166. See infra Section IV.B.
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with which Congress delegates limited authority to executive officials and
agencies to implement policy. 167
A. The Plurality’s Statutory Analysis of SORNA Is Convincing,
Especially in the Aftermath of Reynolds
When the Court decided Reynolds in 2012, it realized that Congress
fashioned SORNA to obligate the Attorney General to take certain actions
(namely, “to apply the new requirements to pre-Act offenders”). 168 Yet,
according to the dissenting opinion in Gundy, section 20913(d)’s delegation
went too far because it gave the Attorney General “a blank check” to exercise
discretion in whatever manner the Attorney General saw fit.169 But as Justice
Kagan observed in the plurality opinion, the Court has never read the
provisions of SORNA so broadly. 170 And because the Reynolds Court
already adopted a narrow interpretation of SORNA, 171 the Reynolds
interpretation of SORNA merits deference under the doctrine of statutory
stare decisis. 172
1. The Reynolds Court Already Determined that SORNA Only
Provides the Attorney General with Limited Delegated Powers
A close reading of Reynolds reveals the Gundy dissenters’ position—
that the Attorney General could refuse to apply SORNA to pre-Act
offenders—was one of the arguments the Government made when the Court
first considered the breadth of SORNA in 2012. 173 But this was an argument
that was rejected by the Court then and is no more persuasive now. 174
Although the Court acknowledged that SORNA did not apply to pre-Act
offenders until the Attorney General affirmatively said that it did, 175 the Court
never stated (or even implied) that the Attorney General could simply decline
to implement the statute’s provisions against pre-Act offenders in the first
167. See infra Section IV.C.
168. Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 444–45 (2012).
169. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2124 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e made clear [in Reynolds] how far SORNA limited
the Attorney General’s authority. And in that way, we effectively resolved the case now before
us.”).
171. See infra Section IV.A.1.
172. See infra Section IV.A.2.
173. Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 444–45 (“The Act’s language, the Government continues,
consequently gives the Attorney General the power not to specify anything . . . . [Yet,] [t]his
argument bases too much upon too little.”).
174. Id. Although the Reynolds Court concluded that SORNA’s provisions do not apply to preAct offenders until the Attorney General says they apply, the Reynolds Court never suggested that
the Attorney General possessed the power to conclude—on his own initiative—that they would
never apply.
175. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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place. 176 On the contrary, the Reynolds majority noted that it would be
difficult to believe Congress thought the Attorney General would fail to apply
SORNA’s requirements to pre-Act offenders given that a primary objective
of the Act was to ensure all offenders (both pre-Act and post-Act offenders)
would be subject to the Act’s registration requirements. 177 Even the Reynolds
dissenters agreed with the majority on this point. 178 And so, even though the
Gundy dissent critiques the plurality’s reliance on legislative history, 179
SORNA’s legislative history—at least as far as the legislation’s core
purposes and reach are concerned—seems to have been largely agreed upon
by the Reynolds Court. 180
But as the Gundy dissenters tell the story, SORNA’s legislative history
at most reveals the “hope[s] and wishe[s]” 181 of some members of Congress
that perhaps some of the pre-Act offenders would someday be subject to
SORNA’s registration requirements. 182 Consider, though, SORNA’s
statement of purpose. There, Congress made its objective clear: It sought to
create a “comprehensive” registration scheme for those offenders implicated
by SORNA. 183 And given this background, the delegation in section
20913(d) has quite a lot of meaning. It is not, as the dissent argues, a vague
expression of faith that the Attorney General might take action someday. 184
It would be quite counterintuitive indeed to assume that Congress created a
“comprehensive” sex offender registration scheme that, for some reason or
another, did not have to apply to pre-Act offenders. 185
Thus, Justice Kagan’s view that SORNA requires the Attorney General
to specify the Act’s applicability to pre-Act offenders “as soon as feasible” 186
is not only a reasonable statutory interpretation but also the most likely. 187
Principal Deputy Solicitor General Jeffery Wall, who argued in favor of
SORNA’s constitutionality on behalf of the United States, made much the

176. See supra text accompanying notes 42 and 44.
177. Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 444 (“[The power claimed by the Government] is inconsistent with
Congress’ intent to ensure the speedy registration of thousands of ‘lost’ pre-Act offenders . . . .”).
178. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct.
2116, 2124 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“In recognizing all this, the majority (temporarily) bonded
with the dissenting Justices, who found it obvious that SORNA was ‘meant to cover pre-Act
offenders.’” (quoting Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 448 (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
179. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2147 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
180. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
181. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2146 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2126–27 (plurality opinion).
184. See supra text accompanying note 181.
185. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2126–27 (plurality opinion) (defining the term “comprehensive” as
“all-encompassing or sweeping”).
186. Id. at 2121.
187. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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same point during oral argument: “And I—to be honest with you, I think it
defies both the text of SORNA and reality to think that Congress was agnostic
about whether hundreds of thousands of people who have committed very
serious sex offenses, as Petitioner has, should be required to register.” 188
Simply put, the fact that section 20913(d) allows some level of
discretion is hardly dispositive of whether the Act allows absolute
discretion. 189 And as Justice Kagan explained during oral argument, no
member of the Reynolds Court, which interpreted the same provision,
disagreed with the premise that Congress intended for the statute to cover
pre-Act offenders. 190 Nothing about the statute’s history or purpose leads to
such a belief. 191 After all, Congress had a good reason for not requiring
“instantaneous registration” 192 of pre-Act offenders in the statute itself—it
would have been a logistical impossibility for all of the pre-Act offenders to
strictly comply with the text of SORNA if not for language allowing them to
be phased in over time. 193
2. The Statutory Interpretation in Reynolds Carries Special Weight
Under the Doctrine of Statutory Stare Decisis
Because the plurality’s rationale is consistent with the statutory
interpretation of the Reynolds Court, the plurality decision finds added
support in the doctrine of statutory stare decisis. 194 Under this doctrine, the
Court gives greater precedential force to its own statutory interpretations than
it does its constitutional interpretations.195 As then-Professor Amy Coney
188. Oral Argument at 47:19, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-6086.
189. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2126 (plurality opinion) (noting that such an argument only prevails
if one reads “the first half of § 20913(d), isolated from everything else”).
190. Oral Argument at 10:20, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-6086 (“[Justice Scalia] — he was dissenting, but nine Justices
in Reynolds all had the same view of this statute, which is that this statute demanded
comprehensiveness in the registration of pre-Act sex offenders. In other words, both in the majority
and in the dissent, this was the one point in common, that they said this statute was designed for
something and this statute did something, that it insisted that ‘sex offender’ should be read broadly
to include any individual who was convicted of a sex offense and that all those people should be
registered, you know, with some feasibility recognition.”).
191. See supra Part III.
192. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130 (plurality opinion) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S.
432, 443 (2012)).
193. Id. at 2128.
194. See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 317, 317 (2005) (explaining “that a party advocating the abandonment of a statutory
precedent bears a greater burden” than a party advocating the abandonment of a constitutional
precedent).
195. Id.; see also Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L. REV.
1165, 1175 (2016) (“Often called ‘statutory stare decisis,’ the principle that precedents in statutory
cases are not to be overturned lightly is justified on several grounds.”); see, e.g., Toolson v. New
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Barrett 196 explains, statutory stare decisis is often defended under two
primary lines of thought. 197 First, some believe that if Congress has failed to
amend a statute (say, for example, SORNA) after the Court’s first attempt at
construing its meaning (here, the decision in Reynolds), then Congress has
acquiesced to the Court’s interpretation. 198 Otherwise, the theory goes,
Congress would not have remained silent but would have taken legislative
action to correct the Court’s interpretive mistake. 199 Second, others believe
that statutory stare decisis is a defensible doctrine because of separation of
powers concerns. 200
According to then-Professor Barrett, the separation of powers approach
to statutory stare decisis was prominently supported by Justice Black. 201 He
believed that statutory interpretation necessarily involves some level of
policymaking—a task the judiciary should be reluctant to engage in. 202
Accordingly, Justice Black’s position was that if the Court must engage in
policymaking to resolve a case or controversy, it should do so as infrequently
as possible. 203 In other words, it should make a policy determination only
once and allow the interpretation to stand unless instructed otherwise by
Congress. 204 Professor Lawrence Marshall takes a slightly different view
than Justice Black. 205 Rather than viewing statutory stare decisis as a
“constitutional mandate,” Professor Marshall views the doctrine as “an

York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (refusing to revisit an earlier statutory interpretation
of federal antitrust laws). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76
GEO. L.J. 1361, 1427–39 (1988) (providing examples of when the Court has opted to overrule its
past statutory interpretations).
196. Amy Coney Barrett is now a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. See David G. Savage, Amy Coney Barrett Is the Favorite of Social Conservatives, but
Democrats are Already Taking Aim, L.A. TIMES (July 9, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-amy-barrett-supreme-court-20180709-story.html
(noting that Barrett was confirmed by the United States Senate in 2017).
197. Barrett, supra note 194, at 322.
198. Id. (“The rationale that has been discussed most widely in both the cases and commentary
is the one I will call ‘congressional acquiescence’—the belief that congressional inaction following
the Supreme Court's interpretation of a statute reflects congressional acquiescence in it.”).
199. Id. at 322–23.
200. Id. at 323.
201. Id. at 325 (“Justice Black is closely associated with the Supreme Court's statutory stare
decisis doctrine, for he was one of its most vocal advocates.”).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 325–26.
205. Id. at 326 (explaining that modern textualists are less likely to follow Justice Black’s
separation of powers rationale and more likely to follow the rationale furthered by Professor
Marshall); see also Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of
Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 183 (1989) (arguing that “the Supreme Court should
adopt an absolute rule of stare decisis for all of its statutory . . . decisions” and “that it is critical to
reinvolve Congress as an active participant in [the] ongoing process of statutory lawmaking”).
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interpretive principle derived from, but not required by, the Constitution's
separation of powers.” 206 The doctrine is worthwhile, in Professor Marshall’s
estimation, because Congress is more likely to amend its own statutes if it
can confidently predict the Court will refuse to depart from its initial
interpretation unless Congress tells it to do so. 207 In brief, Professor
Marshall’s argument is that statutory stare decisis encourages Congress to
take legislative action. 208
Whichever rationale one finds the most persuasive, the fact remains that
the Court tends to accord its prior statutory interpretations great deference. 209
This provides yet another reason why Justice Kagan was correct that
Reynolds “effectively resolved” Gundy’s case.210 Both the Reynolds majority
and dissent agreed that SORNA was designed to reach pre-Act and post-Act
offenders. 211 Thus, to the extent that the Court was required to engage in
policymaking to interpret SORNA in Reynolds, part of its policy
determination was that Congress sought for pre-Act offenders to be covered
in the overall registration scheme. 212 Under the doctrine of statutory stare
decisis, there is no need to revisit that interpretation once again, despite the
Gundy dissenters’ insistence to the contrary. 213 And while adopting the
dissent’s position would not require directly overturning a statutory
interpretation, it would undoubtedly undermine the premise on which the
statutory analysis of Reynolds was based. 214 In sum, the Reynolds Court used
SORNA’s statutory text and legislative history to interpret the Act’s purpose
and effect, 215 but the Gundy dissenters would have the Court re-examine the

206. Barrett, supra note 194, at 326–27.
207. Id. at 327 (“In fact, to better serve that end, Marshall proposes that the Supreme Court
upgrade its statutory presumption from ‘super strong’ to ‘absolute’ on the theory that if Congress
knows that change can come only from it—i.e., that the Supreme Court will never overrule its
statutory precedents—Congress will be more likely to override statutory interpretations that it does
not like.”).
208. Id. (“This version of the separation-of-powers rationale is about creating an incentive for
congressional action.”).
209. See supra note 194.
210. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2124 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“In Reynolds,
the Court considered whether SORNA’s registration requirements applied of their own force to preAct offenders or instead applied only once the Attorney General said they did. We read the statute
as adopting the latter approach. But even as we did so, we made clear how far SORNA limited the
Attorney General’s authority. And in that way, we effectively resolved the case now before us.”).
211. See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text.
214. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (plurality opinion) (“This Court has already interpreted
§ 20913(d) to . . . require the Attorney General to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as
feasible.”); see also id. at 2124 (“Everything in Reynolds started from the premise that Congress
meant for SORNA’s registration requirements to apply to pre-Act offenders.”).
215. Id. at 2124.
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Reynolds judgment as if it never occurred. 216 The doctrine of statutory stare
decisis expressly cautions against this practice. 217
Taken together, it is evident that Congress restricted the extent of
SORNA’s delegation. 218 Congress did not intend to give the Attorney
General total decisional authority on how to apply SORNA to pre-Act
offenders, but rather to provide the Attorney General a reasonable amount of
time to assess the logistical and transitional difficulties of imposing the Act’s
requirements on pre-Act offenders and to develop a plan so that they too
would be subject to SORNA. 219 The Court has routinely upheld precisely
this type of delegation. 220 If there is a case to be made for reviving the
nondelegation doctrine, Gundy certainly is not it.
B. The Court Correctly Applied the Intelligible Principle Test and
Recognized That There Are Many Areas of Permissible Delegation
Not only has the plurality applied a standard (i.e. the intelligible
principle standard) that is consistent with constitutional stare decisis, 221 the
plurality also has left open the door to using other interpretive mechanisms
to limit the amount of discretion Congress can confer to administrative
agencies. 222 Thus, a correct statutory reading of SORNA easily leads to the
conclusion that the Act did not contain an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power. 223
1.

The Plurality’s Opinion Is Consistent with the Doctrine of
Constitutional Stare Decisis

Just as the doctrine of statutory stare decisis provides support for the
Gundy plurality’s opinion, so too does constitutional stare decisis. 224 As
Section II.C explains, nondelegation inquiries have long been conducted
under the intelligible principle standard. 225 Recall the intelligible principle
standard requires only that Congress provide a “broad general directive[]” to
216. Id. at 2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Reynolds would make a difference only if it bound
us as a matter of stare decisis to adopt an interpretation inconsistent with the statute’s terms. And,
of course, it does no such thing.”).
217. See supra notes 203 and 207 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
219. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130 (plurality opinion) (noting that Congress is “dependent” on
“executive officials to implement its programs”).
220. See infra Section IV.B.
221. See infra Section IV.B.1.
222. See infra Section IV.B.2.
223. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality opinion).
224. See id. at 2124 (“Given [our statutory interpretation], Gundy’s constitutional claim must
fail. Section 20913(d)’s delegation falls well within permissible bounds.”).
225. See supra Section II.C.
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guide the delegee’s exercise of power.226 And recall that the Court has
applied the intelligible principle test to every contested delegation since 1935
and has—with only two exceptions—always found that Congress provided
an intelligible principle somewhere within the delegating act.227
So, the relevant question is: Is SORNA finally an example of a post1935 legislative act that has delegated power to the executive branch yet
failed to provide an intelligible principle? For the reasons that follow, the
answer to that question has to be no.
Section 20913(d) provides an “intelligible principle” to guide the
Attorney General’s exercise of authority. 228 The provision requires the
Attorney General to apply the registration requirements of SORNA to preAct offenders “as soon as feasible.” 229 Put differently, the Attorney General
had no choice but to require pre-Act offenders to register (just like their postAct offender counterparts) as soon as the Department of Justice resolved any
transitional and practical difficulties inherent to implementing SORNA. 230
Feasibility standards are admittedly imprecise by definition, but the
intelligible principle standard does not—nor has it ever been construed to—
require exactitude. 231 And though the dissent feared that a feasibility
standard would be immune from meaningful judicial review, 232 that fear is
unfounded. Suppose the Attorney General refused to apply SORNA’s
registration requirements to pre-Act offenders for no other reason than he just
did not feel like it. In such an instance, the Attorney General clearly would
have abandoned his responsibility under section 20913(d) to apply those
registration requirements “as soon as feasible.”
But cast aside, for a moment, the feasibility standard and assume the
Gundy dissenters are correct that it is not plausible to read such a standard
into section 20913(d). 233 Are there any other intelligible principles to be
found in SORNA? A thorough reading of SORNA’s text reveals that there
are indeed. Not only does SORNA limit the universe of offenders who must
register to only sex offenders, it even identifies which subset of sex offenders

226. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
227. See supra text accompanying note 106.
228. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123–24 (plurality opinion).
229. Id. at 2121; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
230. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality opinion) (“The statute conveyed Congress’s policy
that the Attorney General require pre-Act offenders to register as soon as feasible. Under the law,
the feasibility issues he could address were administrative—and, more specifically, transitional—
in nature.”).
231. See supra Section II.C.
232. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 181–182. As discussed supra, there are many reasons
to believe that the feasibility standard is, in fact, a reasonable interpretation of the section 20913(d)
mandate. See supra Section IV.A.1.
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are subject to the registration requirements. 234 It tells us what information
those sex offenders must provide to be SORNA compliant. 235 It tells us how
quickly after changing their “name, residence, employment, or student
status” a sex offender must update their registration information to remain
SORNA compliant. 236 And, of course, SORNA tells us what criminal penalty
attaches for those who fail to comply with the law’s demands. 237 In effect,
each of these provisions are an example of policies or standards that confine
the Attorney General’s discretion. And, returning to the feasibility standard,
SORNA also tells us when the Attorney General must apply each of these
standards to the pre-Act offenders—the Attorney General must do so as soon
as feasible.238 As a result, it is hardly difficult for SORNA to pass the
intelligible principle test.239
For good measure, consider two other instances when the Court has
identified an intelligible principle. In Touby v. United States240—a case about
the Controlled Substances Act—the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
statutory amendment that allowed the Attorney General to temporarily
classify so-called “designer drugs” as schedule I controlled substances. 241
And what “intelligible principle” did Congress provide the Attorney General
in those instances? It required only that the Attorney General consider “three
of the eight factors required for permanent scheduling” and that the Attorney
General determine that scheduling was necessitated because of an immediate
hazard to public safety. 242 Touby is also notable for what it did not require.
It did not require the Attorney General to engage in the formal administrative
rulemaking process nor did it provide any opportunity for meaningful judicial
review. 243 And even though the Attorney General’s scheduling of a
substance would have the effect of criminalizing that substance’s use, the
Court still concluded it was not an unconstitutional delegation of power. 244

234. 34 U.S.C. § 20911 (2018) (defining the term “sex offense” and explaining that some sex
offenses, such as those involving consensual sexual conduct, are not implicated by SORNA’s
registration requirements).
235. Id. § 20914(d) (explaining that sex offenders must provide, among other things, their name,
social security number, residential address, and license plate number).
236. Id. § 20913(c) (explaining that the offender must appear in person to notify a sex offender
registry official of any changes within three business days of such a change occurring).
237. Id. § 20913(e) (“Each jurisdiction, other than a Federally recognized Indian tribe, shall
provide a criminal penalty that includes a maximum term of imprisonment that is greater than 1 year
for the failure of a sex offender to comply with the requirements of this subchapter.”).
238. See supra Section IV.A.
239. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality opinion).
240. 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
241. Id. at 162–63, 169.
242. Id. at 163 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 169.
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Before Touby, the Mistretta Court upheld the creation of a federal
Sentencing Commission, even though the Commission was given the power
to impose binding sentencing ranges on federal trial judges. 245 Although the
Commission was required to consider certain factors as it made its
determinations, Congress left it to the Commission to determine which
crimes should be considered similar for purposes of sentencing. 246 Congress
also charged the Commission with the ability to make determinations about
the severity of offenses. 247
Thus, it cannot be disputed that the delegations in Touby and Mistretta
gave a great amount of discretion to the Attorney General and Sentencing
Commission, respectively. And yet, even then, nearly every member of the
Court agreed that the delegations were constitutionally permissible. 248 The
discretion in SORNA is nowhere near as great. Unlike in Mistretta, in which
the Commission was empowered to determine the severity of criminal
sanctions, SORNA accords the Attorney General no comparable power.
Once the Attorney General resolves the transitional difficulties of SORNA,
both pre-Act and post-Act offenders must be treated exactly the same. 249
SORNA also tells us what penalties non-compliant sex offenders will face. 250
And, unlike in Touby, which effectively permitted the Attorney General to
make a policy judgment about whether a given substance posed a threat to
the public, 251 the Attorney General is only permitted to delay enforcing
SORNA against pre-Act offenders for feasibility reasons. 252 If the
delegations in Touby and Mistretta posed no nondelegation concern, Gundy
should have been a slam dunk. 253 It is telling indeed that when asked to
determine the constitutionality of SORNA “all federal circuit courts
addressing the issue had rejected . . . nondelegation challenges.” 254
For its part, the dissent made clear that it found little value in the Court’s
nondelegation precedents. 255 Unable to rely on the intelligible principle
standard to strike down section 20913(d), the dissent instead offered an
245. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 369 (1989).
246. Id. at 377–78.
247. Id. at 377.
248. See supra note 100 (noting that Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter in Mistretta). There
was no dissenting opinion in Touby.
249. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123–24 (2019) (explaining that the Attorney
General only has discretion to consider and address SORNA’s feasibility issues).
250. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(e) (2018).
251. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 249.
253. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (asserting that determining SORNA’s constitutionality “is
easy”).
254. Wayne A. Logan, Gundy v. United States: Gunning for the Administrative State, 17 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 185, 185 (2019).
255. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting).
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entirely different test for nondelegation challenges. 256 But its proposed
tripartite test is nowhere to be found in Touby, Mistretta, or any other recent
nondelegation case. As a result, the dissent’s approach cannot be reconciled
with principles of constitutional stare decisis. As Section IV.C.3 explains, it
is hard to know if the delegations in Touby or Mistretta could survive the
dissent’s reformulated nondelegation standard. 257
2. Overbroad Delegations Can Already Be Narrowed or Invalidated
Through Existing Interpretive Mechanisms
Nondelegation doctrine aside, there are already other ways, including
the substantive canons of statutory construction, for the Court to curb broad
acts of delegation—and the Gundy plurality has done nothing to preclude the
Court from using those methods in future cases. As this Section explains, the
void for vagueness canon, canon of constitutional avoidance, and major
questions doctrine each remain avenues to limit acts of Congressional
delegation.
First, Justice Gorsuch noted in his dissent that the Court’s void for
vagueness doctrine remains an avenue for challenging laws that could be
applied arbitrarily. 258 It tells us that the Court may invalidate laws that either
(1) fail to give fair notice of what conduct is prohibited, or (2) are so
standardless that they effectively encourage arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement. 259 In either instance, the challenged legislation violates
principles of due process. 260 And according to the Gundy dissent, “most any
challenge to a legislative delegation can be reframed as a vagueness
complaint.” 261
Second, though perhaps more controversial, there is the canon of
constitutional avoidance. 262 This canon expresses the idea that if the Court
is presented with a construction of a statute that raises constitutional doubt,
the Court should instead construe the statute to avoid the constitutional
problem “unless such [a] construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress.” 263 The rationale for the avoidance canon was summarized most
256. See supra Section III.
257. See infra Section IV.C.3.
258. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142.
259. Emily M. Snoddon, Comment, Clarifying Vagueness: Rethinking the Supreme Court’s
Vagueness Doctrine, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 2301, 2302 (2019).
260. Id.
261. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting).
262. See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45153, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS 29–30 (2018) (providing an explanation of the
substantive canons of statutory construction).
263. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499–501, 504 (1979)); see
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effectively by Justice White 264: Because Congress (like the Court) “swears
an oath to uphold the Constitution,” the Court should be reticent to assume
that Congress would draft a statute that violates the Constitution. 265
Despite its routine use, the avoidance canon has garnered criticism from
legal scholars, especially those who approach statutory interpretation from a
textualist perspective. 266 As Judge Barrett has argued, substantive canons
like constitutional avoidance can be used in a manner that is inconsistent with
congressional intent. 267 One can think of this use of constitutional
avoidance—the variety that “advance[s] policies independent of those
expressed in the statute” 268—as “aggressive avoidance.” And indeed,
reluctance to embrace aggressive avoidance has a great deal of logical appeal.
When the Court strains itself to find any interpretation that will avoid
constitutional conflict, even if highly implausible and likely contrary to
Congress’s true intent, the Court has not acted as a faithful agent of
Congress. 269 It has instead rewritten the statute as if the Court were itself a
legislature. 270 It may be a fine line to draw, but there is a distinction between
interpreting the law, on the one hand, and entirely reshaping a legislative
enactment, on the other. 271
Still, textualists (Judge Barrett and the late Justice Antonin Scalia
among them) agree that this concern fades away when two competing
statutory interpretations are equally plausible and only one of those
interpretations raises constitutional doubt. 272 One can think of this as
“standard avoidance.” In those instances, the avoidance canon serves only
also BRANNON, supra note 262, at 29 (noting that the avoidance canon urges reading statutes in a
manner that “avoid[s] the constitutional issue”).
264. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575.
265. Id.
266. See generally Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 109 (2010) (explaining the tension between substantive canons of construction and “a strong
commitment to legislative supremacy”); see also Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive
Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L.
REV. 164, 169–76 (2019) (arguing that the Gundy plurality aggressively applied the avoidance
canon).
267. Barrett, supra note 266, at 110 (“A court applying a canon to strain statutory text uses
something other than the legislative will as its interpretive lodestar, and in so doing, it acts as
something other than a faithful agent.”).
268. Id. (emphasis added).
269. Id.
270. See id. (noting that an important component of statutory interpretation is the notion of
legislative supremacy).
271. See id. at 123–24 (“Substantive canons are in significant tension with textualism, however,
insofar as their application can require a judge to adopt something other than the most textually
plausible meaning of a statute.”).
272. Id. at 123 (“Substantive canons [like constitutional avoidance] are in no tension with
faithful agency insofar as they are used as tie breakers between equally plausible interpretations of
a statute. Textualists have no difficulty taking policy into account when language is ambiguous.”).
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as “an interpretive tiebreaker—[in other words,] if there are two equally
plausible readings of the statute, the avoidance canon selects the winner.” 273
The competing interpretations of SORNA are precisely such an example. 274
And in this way, using the canon of constitutional avoidance to read a
feasibility standard into section 20913(d) is a result that is consistent with
textualism because the feasibility standard is an equally (if not more)
reasonable reading of SORNA. 275 Thus, one of the more persuasive
criticisms of the avoidance canon—that it can be used to “select the less
plausible interpretation if doing so avoids constitutional difficulties”276—is
inapplicable here. 277
Finally, the Gundy dissenters remind us that the Court has used the
major questions doctrine to invalidate agency actions that have substantial
economic and political effects. 278 As a general matter, Congress authorizes
agencies to take certain actions by drafting authorizing statutes. 279 Often
And under a well-known
those statutes contain ambiguities.280
administrative law doctrine known as Chevron deference, the agencies
themselves are given leeway to adopt a reasonable interpretation of
ambiguous statutory directives. 281 So long as the agency’s interpretation is

273. Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L.
REV., 1275, 1280 (2016).
274. See supra text accompanying notes 186–187.
275. See supra text accompanying note 188.
276. Fish, supra note 273, at 1280 (emphasis added).
277. But see Bamzai, supra note 266, at 169 (“The plurality’s method of interpreting SORNA
is an aggressive, albeit implicit, application of the principle that the Court can address nondelegation
challenges by ‘giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought
to be unconstitutional.’” (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989))).
278. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“But we
don’t [allow an executive agency to fill in statutory gaps] when the ‘statutory gap’ concerns ‘a
question of deep “economic and political significance” that is central to the statutory scheme.’”
(quoting King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015))).
279. Joshua S. Sellers, “Major Questions” Moderation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 930, 932
(2019).
280. Id.
281. Id.; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(“If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,
the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.”) (citations omitted); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan,
Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 205–06 (2001) (“In the beginning (at
least for the purposes of this article), there was Chevron. The question in that case concerned
whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had acted lawfully when it issued a rule, in
accordance with applicable notice-and-comment procedures, defining the term ‘stationary source’
in the Clean Air Act to refer to whole plants, rather than each pollution-emitting device within them.
In sustaining the rule, the Court prescribed a by now well-known, two-step inquiry to govern judicial
review of an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency administers. The first question is
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reasonable, it will be left undisturbed if challenged in court. 282 But there is
an exception. Under the major questions doctrine, the agency action receives
considerably less deference when the statutory ambiguity is one that is a
matter of great political or economic significance.283 In these instances, the
Court has the ability to override the agency’s interpretation.284
So, if these interpretive mechanisms (among others) exist as means to
cabin the amount of authority conferred to the executive branch by legislative
enactments, why the sudden need to overrule well-settled law to resuscitate
a doctrine that has long been relegated to the legal history books? The dissent
does not offer a sufficiently compelling reason. 285
C. The Court Underemphasized the Practical Consequences of
Reviving the Nondelegation Doctrine
The Gundy Court correctly recognized that nondelegation inquiries are
basically statutory analyses. 286 Thus, as one might expect, Justice Kagan
spent the bulk of her opinion walking through the plurality’s statutory
interpretation of SORNA. 287 After identifying an intelligible principle in
section 20913(d) (i.e. the feasibility standard), the plurality concluded that
SORNA—like so many statutes before it—posed no nondelegation
problem. 288 But largely lost in the plurality’s opinion was a discussion of
why the Court permits administrative deference in the first place and why the
approach suggested by the dissent would have such profound consequences
for the modern administrative state. In short, the plurality opinion does not
spend much time discussing the practical problems of reviving the
nondelegation doctrine other than to warn that “if SORNA’s delegation is
unconstitutional, then most of Government is unconstitutional.” 289 Though

‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue’; if so, the agency must
comply with that judgment. The second question, reached only if Congress failed to speak clearly,
is whether the agency has adopted a ‘reasonable’ interpretation of the statute; if so, the courts must
accept that interpretation.”) (footnotes omitted).
282. Sellers, supra note 279, at 932.
283. Id. at 946 (explaining that “major questions” allow the Court to “circumvent the traditional
deference regime”).
284. Id. at 947 (noting that critics assert the major questions doctrine “has almost invariably
been used in opposition to agency action”).
285. In fact, the dissent undercut its argument that such a dramatic reversal was appropriate
when it readily acknowledged that the Court has never “just throw[n] up [its] hands” in instances
where “the separation of powers is at stake.” Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 2123 (plurality opinion) (“[A] nondelegation inquiry always begins (and often almost
ends) with statutory interpretation.”).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 2129.
289. Id. at 2130.
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not in an exhaustive manner, this Section seeks to fill that gap. Section
IV.C.1 discusses the institutional competency argument for allowing
administrative agencies to exercise delegated powers. 290 Section IV.C.2
explains that upholding acts of congressional delegation promotes judicial
restraint. 291 Lastly, Section IV.C.3 examines the logistical complications
inherent to a revival of the nondelegation doctrine. 292
1.

The Current Application of the Nondelegation Doctrine
Recognizes the Institutional Competencies of the Respective
Branches of Government

As an initial matter, it is worth considering why the Court should (and
does) permit delegations of power in the first place. One of the main reasons
for allowing limited delegations of authority is that Congress cannot perform
its lawmaking function if it is bogged down by the minutiae of implementing
those governmental programs itself. 293 A complementary argument can be
made that, at least in some instances, an executive department or agency is
more institutionally competent to work through the nuances of administering
a complex law than a legislative body. 294 As such, Congress simply assigns
this work to those administrative agencies. 295
This argument is especially compelling in instances when the agency is
tasked with resolving issues that are highly technical or scientific in nature. 296
But even when the delegation is not because a heightened level of expertise
is needed (for example, if the delegation exists to address feasibility
concerns), an administrative agency may still be the better institution to deal
with the underlying problem. 297 In these instances, there is simply no need
for Congress to expend the time necessary to contemplate every possible
transitional hurdle involved in enforcing a new statutory scheme. The
intelligible principle standard, thus, recognizes that Congress should instead

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See infra Section IV.C.1.
See infra Section IV.C.2.
See infra Section IV.C.3.
See supra text accompanying note 101.
See supra note 219.
See Jack M. Beermann, The Never-Ending Assault on the Administrative State, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1599, 1602 (2018) (explaining that “[t]he administrative state was designed by
Congress” itself).
296. Id. at 1647 (“But properly applied, the doctrines that instruct courts to defer to agencies
involve well-thought-out agency policies informed by scientific judgments, longstanding
acquaintance with the issues involved or express delegations from Congress to make particular
determinations.”).
297. Id. at 1651 (“In today’s world of global interdependence and economic, political, and
security threats emerging from every corner of the planet, any other course of action for the United
States [other than one involving a regulatory regime] would be foolhardy.”).
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focus on the “big picture,” not the intricacies of enforcing the law. 298 Indeed,
this is the purpose of the executive branch.
Additionally, limited delegation of policymaking power to the executive
branch allows agencies to “respond to changing circumstances” (via the
administrative rulemaking process) more quickly than is possible through the
traditional legislative process. 299 Consider, for example, how SORNA might
have been affected had Congress specified a particular timeline for
enforcement of the registration requirements against pre-Act offenders. Say
section 20913(d) mandated a five-year phase-in period before SORNA’s
registration requirements would apply to pre-Act offenders but that the
Attorney General found a workable solution that could be implemented
within six months. What reason would there be to prevent the Attorney
General from acting swiftly? And outside of the SORNA context, the
examples are even clearer. Suppose a vehicle safety report was released that
recommended a new (and relatively inexpensive) innovation in airbag
equipment that could save thousands of lives. Is there any good reason to
wait for Congress to pass a new piece of legislation when the Department of
Transportation, staffed with experts on automotive safety, could do so more
quickly? Probably not—especially given that those agency experts are still
required to follow the intelligible principle(s) that Congress has provided to
guide its decisional authority. 300
2.

The Current Application of the Nondelegation Doctrine
Recognizes the Value of Judicial Restraint

In his impassioned dissent in Gundy, Justice Gorsuch extolled the
virtues of the separation of powers and political accountability and explained
the thought process undergirding the Framers’ design of the American
constitutional structure. 301 According to the dissent, these principles and
foundational history cannot be squared with the Court’s current approach to

298. See id. at 1609 (“Legislatively, for the most part Congress has been supportive of the
administrative state. After all, the existence and structure of federal agencies is based on statutes
passed by Congress. Congress consistently delegates authority to administrative agencies, shields
some of them from complete presidential control, and prescribes deferential judicial review of
agency action while occasionally exempting some agency actions from review altogether.”).
299. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Did the Dissent in Gundy v. United States Open Up a Can of Worms?,
AM. CONST. SOC’Y: EXPERT F. (June 24, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/did-thedissent-in-gundy-v-united-states-open-up-a-can-of-worms/.
300. See supra Section II.C (explaining the intelligible principle standard).
301. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (explaining
that the Framers believed our system of governance would be frustrated if Congress were permitted
to “announce vague aspirations and then assign others the responsibility of adopting legislation to
realize its goals”).
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the nondelegation doctrine. 302 Yet, the approach the dissent proposed would
raise a jurisprudential dilemma of a different kind—namely, whether it gives
due respect to the value of judicial restraint. And indeed, this argument
complements the institutional competency argument. 303
When Congress decides to delegate power from itself to the executive
branch, it is doing so because it has made a judgment that the executive
branch can properly exercise that delegated power. But successful
invocations of the nondelegation doctrine necessarily mean that the Court has
used its power of judicial review to substitute its judgment over that of
Congress. 304 Of course, no one suggests that this means Congress can never
go too far in its delegations. In some instances, the congressional delegation
of power may be so all-encompassing that it offends the separation of powers.
And in these situations—situations where there is no intelligible principle to
guide the delegee’s exercise of power—the nondelegation doctrine remains
a viable option. Even still, without reaching the nondelegation question, the
Court will likely be able to invoke the major questions doctrine or a
substantive canon of statutory construction to read the delegation
narrowly. 305 And if the Court chooses to adopt an equally plausible (yet
narrower) interpretation to avoid a constitutional conflict, the Court is acting
as a faithful agent of Congress by giving meaning to the statutory language
embedded within the challenged act. 306
Still, larger problems with reviving the nondelegation doctrine exist.
Judges may resort to their own ideological priors and policy preferences to
distinguish permissible delegations from those that are impermissible. 307
Take, for example, one of the prongs of the dissent’s tripartite analysis—the
“fill up the details” test.308 How is the Court supposed to distinguish a
302. Id. at 2139 (arguing that the intelligible principle standard has “take[n] on a life of its own”
that is completely divorced from its original meaning and context).
303. See supra Section IV.C.1.
304. In other words, the Court is overriding Congress’s judgment that certain details are best
left to the Executive to discern. See Lisa Heinzerling, How the Supreme Court Created a
Constitutional Case Against the Administrative State, AM. CONST. SOC’Y: EXPERT F. (Aug. 29,
2018), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/how-the-supreme-court-created-a-constitutional-caseagainst-the-administrative-state/ (“As Justice Scalia once wrote, given the ‘multifarious’ and
‘highly political’ nature of the relevant inquiry, the Court has ‘almost never felt qualified to secondguess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those
executing or applying that law.’”). This judgment substitution takes shape in the most dramatic
fashion—eliminating entire provisions of legislative enactments. See id.
305. See supra Section IV.B.2.
306. Barrett, supra note 266, at 123.
307. Heinzerling, supra note 304 (“A large worry is that unelected judges applying a revitalized
nondelegation doctrine would be left to follow their own, personal impulses in drawing the line
separating acceptable from unacceptable delegations.”).
308. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)).

1118

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:1086

“detail” from an integral part of a statutory scheme? The dissent does not tell
us. As a consequence, there is little to stop the “fill up the details” test from
becoming anything more than a subjective value judgment by the reviewing
court. 309
Judicial overreach becomes even more troublesome given that the risk
would be created by disregarding nearly a century of precedent because,
according to the dissenters, the Court seems to have misunderstood a key
aspect of constitutional law each time it has been asked to resolve a case
about it. 310 In essence, the dissent has argued that time and time again the
Court has applied the wrong standard to contested acts of delegation. 311
And even though the dissent cleverly characterizes its approach as a
mere return to the “traditional rule” of nondelegation, 312 everyone—
including the dissent’s author—acknowledges that the dissent’s proposed
standard is a significant departure from the approach to nondelegation
inquiries that the Court has used in every nondelegation challenge since
1935. 313 Given this history, adopting the dissent’s tripartite approach and
discarding the intelligible principle standard as it has been applied for the last
eighty-five years would embody judicial hubris of the very worst kind.
3. Reviving the Nondelegation Doctrine Would Result in a Logistical
Nightmare
Finally, it remains unclear how the dissent would apply its proposed
standard to the acts of delegation (too numerous to name) that have survived
under the existing intelligible principle standard but would trigger scrutiny
under the dissent’s tripartite test. 314 Indeed, the Court’s longstanding
approach to the nondelegation doctrine has proven imminently workable
because only the most egregious acts of delegation come within its reach. 315
This has in turn given Congress the ability mostly to determine for itself
309. Id.
310. See supra Sections II.B–C, IV.B.
311. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 2139.
313. See id. at 2130 (plurality opinion) (explaining that “most of Government is
unconstitutional” under the dissent’s view of nondelegation); see also id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (noting that SORNA’s delegation is permissible “under the approach [the] Court has
taken for many years”); id. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the dissent’s approach is
a return to a “more traditional separation-of-powers test[]” and a departure from the Court’s
“mutated version of the ‘intelligible principle’” test).
314. See Brief for the United States at 56, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086) (“If petitioner
means to argue that Congress can never confer authority on the Executive to make such
determinations, his rule would be at odds with this Court’s many decisions to the contrary, and it
would frustrate Congress’s ability to enlist the Executive’s assistance in dealing with complex and
changing problems.” (citations omitted)).
315. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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which decisions are best left to departmental and agency experts,316 and it has
prevented the courts from becoming overburdened with nondelegation
claims. 317 Most importantly, it recognizes the large role the administrative
state now plays in American government. 318 Congressional delegations are
simply a fact of life in modern governance. 319 Everything from clean air
standards 320 to financial regulation, 321 food and drug laws, 322 and workplace
safety rules 323 are a product of the administrative process that necessarily
involve delegations of power from Congress to administrative agencies.324
In fact, (depending on who you ask) there are more than 400—yes, 400—
administrative agencies responsible for making these determinations. 325 And
all of these agencies exist because Congress has delegated power to them to

316. William D. Araiza, Toward a Non-Delegation Doctrine That (Even) Progressives Could
Like, AM. CONST. SOC’Y SUP. CT. REV., 2018-2019, at 211, 219–220, https://www.acslaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/ACS-Supreme-Court-Review-2018-2019.pdf (noting that Congress often
delegates power in the face of a lack of substantive expertise or because of Congress’s own
“institutional inflexibility”); see also supra Section IV.B.
317. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: How the Roberts Court Could Alter the
BAR
ASS’N
J.
(Sept.
4,
2019),
Administrative
State,
AM.
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky-the-roberts-court-could-alter-theadministrative-state (explaining that new limits on the administrative state would lead to an increase
in “judicial review of agency decisions”).
318. Nicholas Bagley, “Most of Government Is Unconstitutional,” N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/opinion/sunday/gundy-united-states.html (“Since 1935, the
Supreme Court has approved laws telling agencies to regulate ‘in the public interest’ and to set
pollution standards ‘requisite to protect the public health.’ Not once in the 84 years since has the
Supreme Court invalidated a law because it offends the so-called nondelegation doctrine.”).
319. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 295, at 1602 (“Administrative state skeptics, especially in
the academy . . . continue to take aim at the heart of the administrative state. Unfortunately for
administrative state skeptics, the courts and Congress consistently turn those efforts back,
maintaining the features of the administrative state by and large intact.”).
320. Id. at 1612 (“[A]nd any suggestion that the Court was ready to reinvigorate the
nondelegation doctrine was laid to rest in the Court’s 2001 decision upholding a key provision of
the Clean Air Act against a nondelegation challenge.”). But see Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct.
2116, 2131–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of a reinvigorated nondelegation
doctrine).
321. See Beermann, supra note 295, at 1646 (“The regulatory standards enforced through
inspections and subpoenas protect the physical and financial well-being of millions of people,
ranging from workers who rely on OSHA safety standards in their workplaces to patients who rely
on the FDA to ensure the safety of drugs, medical devices, and food products to investors who rely
on the SEC and other agencies to ensure the safety of financial products and markets.”).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1612
325. See Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., How Many Federal Agencies Exist? We Can’t Drain The
Swamp Until We Know, FORBES (July 5, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2017/07
/05/how-many-federal-agencies-exist-we-cant-drain-the-swamp-until-we-know/#4f9078f21aa2
(explaining the difficulty of counting how many federal agencies there are).
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create rules and regulations germane to their respective areas of expertise.326
But if the intelligible principle standard were tossed away, all of these
delegations could presumably be litigated (or re-litigated) in the federal
courts. 327 Whether they would survive is anyone’s guess.
Thus, as Professor Lisa Heinzerling has explained, the consequences of
reviving the nondelegation doctrine would be devastating for the U.S.
regulatory framework. 328 According to Professor Heinzerling:
In determining the constitutional validity of the modern
administrative state, the nondelegation doctrine is the big one. The
only doctrine that could come close, in terms of damage to the
premises underlying the administrate state, would be the
substantive due process theory embraced and then abandoned in
the first half of the twentieth century. 329
Not to worry, the Gundy dissent says, 330 some already-approved delegations
are consistent with its reformulated standard. 331 But left unsaid is which (or
how many) delegations would not survive. More to the point, the dissent
does not explain—as a practical matter—how the courts, Congress, and the
executive branch would clean up the mess that would be made if countless
acts of delegation suddenly became constitutionally nonviable. 332 Certainly,
these are questions that must be answered before dismantling a “federal
government [that has grown] explosively.” 333
V. CONCLUSION
In Gundy v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that section 20913(d) of SORNA does not violate the nondelegation doctrine
because the provision requires the Attorney General to apply SORNA’s
registration requirements to pre-Act offenders “as soon as feasible.” 334 The
Court was correct in its judgment because the Court’s statutory interpretation
of SORNA was consistent with its prior decision in Reynolds v. United States,
and because the outcome in Gundy was within the bounds of the intelligible

326. See Beermann, supra note 295, at 1605 (“Further, Congress has instructed federal courts
reviewing the exercise of regulatory discretion to defer to agency judgments, and the courts,
including the Supreme Court, have embraced that requirement with alacrity.”).
327. See Chemerinsky, supra note 317.
328. Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1970 (2017).
329. Id.
330. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2145 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing
the dissent’s approach would not “spell doom for what some call the ‘administrative state’”).
331. Id.
332. See Bagley, supra note 318.
333. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137.
334. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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principle test that the Court has used in nondelegation cases since 1935. 335
But the plurality’s opinion would have been more persuasive had it
emphasized the negative practical consequences likely to follow from
adopting the dissent’s position. 336

335. See supra Section IV.A–B.
336. See supra Section IV.C.

